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Recent trade disputes between the European Union and the United States over
bananas have served to emphasize the differences between the “dollar zone” commodity
system based on Latin American banana exports to the United States and Europe, and the
“ACP system,” based on European imports of bananas produced in former colonies in
Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific. The key difference often identified by analysts is
the dominant role played by vertically integrated U.S. banana corporations in Latin
America in contrast to the ACP production system in which state-sponsored associations
of small-scale growers receive preferential access to European markets (Raynolds 2003:
23-47). There can be little doubt that the reorientation of Caribbean producers toward
Europe following the Second World War marked a moment when the banana commodity
system in that region diverged from that of Latin America. However, the tendency of
researchers to focus on twentieth-century banana trades has had the unintended effect of
obscuring the trades’ origins in the late nineteenth century, a period when a sharp divide
between Caribbean and Latin American commodity systems did not exist. Indeed, it is
easy to forget that the roots of the United Fruit Company (today known as Chiquita
Brands International) lie in both the Caribbean and Central America. 
This article re-examines the emergence of export banana production in Jamaica by
focusing on the relationships between Jamaican “small settlers,” North American ship-
pers, and colonial policymakers.1 Most published accounts of nineteenth-century export
banana trades rely on a handful of secondary sources which, often written from the per-
spective of the North Atlantic shipping companies, tend to characterize the period as
“chaotic” and “disorganized.”2 However, from the vantage point of small-scale cultiva-
tors, the period between 1870 and 1900 represented a rare opportunity to gain access to
both land and expanding North Atlantic markets for tropical foods and beverages. When
the banana industry began in Jamaica, the institution of slavery was a memory, but eco-
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1 I employ “small settler,” “small holder,” and “small-scale cultivator” interchangeably. According to
Olivier, “small settler” was the term with which small-scale Jamaican farmers referred to themselves
(Olivier 1936). Precise estimates of how much land small settlers cultivated are difficult to determine,
but most plots probably did not exceed five acres (Satchell 1990: 7-8).
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nomic exploitation and political exclusion continued to be a part of the lived experiences
of Afro-Jamaicans. In this context, the participation of black Jamaican small settlers dur-
ing the early years of the fruit trade can be seen as an attempt to avoid coercive labor
practices and unstable tenancies. In their desire to forge dignified livelihoods after slav-
ery, Anglophone blacks would also help to initiate late-nineteenth-century banana pro-
duction in Caribbean Costa Rica and the Bay Islands of Honduras.3
The early banana trade was not without risks. Hurricanes struck export-banana grow-
ing parishes of Jamaica in 1874, 1880, 1886, 1889, 1899, and 1903. In addition, “blow
downs,” or localized windstorms, caused the greatest pre-harvest fruit losses for late-
nineteenth-century farmers. Export banana growers faced less dramatic but equally
important perils when trying to sell their highly perishable commodity to brokers and
shippers determined to maximize profits and minimize financial risks. One of the ways
that shipping companies tried to reduce losses was through the development of standards
for fruit quality and pricing. Another strategy pursued by some shipping companies was
vertical integration. In the late 1880s, a handful of island-based and foreign investors
began buying abandoned sugar estates and converting them to banana plantations. As
prices increased for arable land in close proximity to seaports, small settlers were forced
to lease land or move into the island’s highland interior.
Thomas Holt has argued that colonial policy during this period of economic transi-
tion in Jamaica was highly contradictory: “During an era in which racist ideology was
becoming more virulent and practically unchallenged, official policy was grounded para-
doxically on the entrepreneurship of black Jamaicans” (Holt 1992: 317). Small-scale
Afro-Jamaican cultivators produced the vast majority of food for both local and export
markets including yams, coffee, ginger, fruit, and pimento.4 In spite of this reality, gov-
ernment officials continued to praise and support large-scale production by providing
subsidies including the importation of indentured labor from South Asia (Look Lai
2004). The deep ambivalence with which government bureaucrats viewed the centrality
of Afro-Jamaican smallholders to island agriculture is reflected in the pages of the Jour-
nal of the Jamaica Agricultural Society (JAS) whose “technical” advice on agriculture
was often couched in paternalistic language based on implicit adherence to racial ideolo-
gies that perpetuated, albeit in new forms, ideas of white Anglo-supremacy. The jour-
nal’s contributors both acknowledged the potential of small settlers and criticized their
agricultural practices as backward and ecologically destructive.
Because they carried out the vast majority of the agricultural work on the island,
there can be little doubt that small settlers were leading agents of environmental change.
Nevertheless, I argue that colonial officials “misread” the island’s changing agro-land-
scapes by decoupling the actions of small settlers’ from the re-emergence of a plantation
economy and ascribing environmental decline to the static “customs” of Afro-Jamaicans.
Drawing on frameworks from political ecology, I analyze discourses of environmental
degradation to reveal the contradictions in colonial bureaucrats’ efforts to promote export
banana cultivation as an “all-Jamaica” project; increasing the island’s output of high
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quality bananas became a central policy objective that sought to redefine the question of
how to improve the lives of small settlers into one of technical capacity.5 Although some
colonial officials acknowledged the historical responsibility of the white planter class for
the economic and political marginalization of Afro-Jamaican smallholders, the sugges-
tion that modern plantations contributed to social and ecological problems remained out-
side the realm of official discourses. 
Smallholders, Shippers, and the Struggle to Control Production
Scholars have often commented on the tightly entwined histories of slavery and
sugar in the Caribbean, but the connection between slavery and banana production in the
region has yet to be thoroughly examined. In major cane-growing regions of the
Caribbean and Latin America, slaves cultivated bananas and plantains for a variety of
reasons including as a shade plant for other crops, as a source of food, and as a commod-
ity for exchange on local markets.6 Limited evidence from the post-emancipation period
suggests that small settlers continued to use bananas and plantains as nurse crops to
shade coffee, cacao, and other cultivars in the late nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
turies.7 Jamaican women played a crucial role as middle brokers (higglers) in a cash
economy, a historical antecedent that helps to explain the prominence of women in the
production and transport of bananas. In sum, most smallholders in the Caribbean were
already experienced with producing, marketing, and consuming bananas when the first
North American traders began purchasing fruit.8
The banana variety that would dominate the export trade, the Gros Michel, reported-
ly reached Jamaica in 1835, when botanist Jean Francois Pouyat planted a single speci-
men that he acquired during a trip to Martinique. The variety became extremely popular
in Jamaica where locals called it the “banana Pouyat” or “Martinique banana” (Rodri-
quez 1955: 11-12). The pre-export history of Gros Michel remains murky but if it is true
that the variety was widely cultivated on the island in the mid-nineteenth century, then it
is likely that Afro-Jamaican cultivation practices and foodways conditioned the interna-
tional banana trade by making Gros Michel fruit readily available to North American
traders. That said, the widespread cultivation of Gros Michel bananas in Jamaica could
not have been more than one or two generations old before the export trade began. More-
over, growing bananas in home gardens was similar to, but not the same as, growing
bananas for export markets for reasons that I outline below. Consequently, the idea that
Afro-Jamaicans possessed unique knowledge of Gros Michel cultivation may have
reflected an “invented tradition” not unlike what Michel-Rolph Trouillot found in twen-
tieth-century Dominica (Trouillot 1988: 120-137).
The association of bananas with blackness in nineteenth-century Jamaica was suffi-
ciently strong to discourage most white planters from cultivating them for export, even
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when it was clear that the sugar industry was in decline.9 Consequently, as planters took
cane land out of production, property values dropped sharply, contributing to a rise in the
number of “small-settlers” who purchased plots of estate lands. Veront Satchell’s study
of land transfers in Jamaica found that the number of small holders rose significantly
through 1890 (Satchell 1990: 83-109; 111-150). In 1883-4, more than 90 percent of the
land holdings in Portland Parish—the largest producer of export bananas in Jamaica—
were less than ten acres (Bartlett 1977: 50). Three years later, testimonies submitted
before the Jamaican Legislative Council indicated that bananas had largely replaced
ground provisions in Portland (Minutes 1887: 13, 17). One source indicates that the
Boston Fruit Company purchased nearly four-fifths of the bananas that it exported in
1890 (Bacon 1890: 152-3). One indication that smallholders made economic gains dur-
ing the 1880s was a major increase in both the value of deposits and the number of
accounts in the government savings bank in Port Antonio, the principal banana port in
Portland (Holt 1992: 349). Although precise data on the size of banana farms is hard to
come by for the late nineteenth century, virtually all observers acknowledged that small
settlers were “the backbone of the country” (Despatches 1886). 
North American shippers began purchasing fruits, including bananas, coconuts, and
citrus, from Jamaican growers in the late 1860s (Rodriquez 1955: 25; Despatches 1884).
Among the early traders was George Busch, a schooner captain who had experience
trading Cuban red bananas. In 1869 Busch associated with two Port Antonio merchants
to purchase fruit for U.S. importers. One year later, John Edward Kerr began buying and
selling fruit in Montego Bay. Within ten years he had financed the construction of two
steamships designed to transport bananas. Around the same time, Lorenzo Dow Baker, a
fishing captain from Cape Cod, entered into the fruit trade. Throughout the 1870s many
wholesale fruit dealers established themselves in towns situated along Jamaica’s north-
east coastline suggesting that there were other schooner captains who experimented with
fruit exports (Hall 1964: 62-65). During this period, wind-powered vessels dominated
the trade, accounting for two-thirds of exports from Jamaica as late as 1878. However,
sometime around 1880, the colonial government began subsidizing the Atlas Steamship
Company to carry relatively small cargoes of fruit on its lines servicing Jamaica and
New York. This policy had limited success, but by 1882 unsubsidized steamers account-
ed for two-thirds of the fruit leaving Jamaican ports; schooners accounted for less than
one-sixth of the trade (Despatches 1884).
In order to be profitable, early shippers had to secure a steady supply of bananas that
would not ripen prior to reaching consumer markets. Shipping agents alerted growers
about when and where they could sell their fruit. This system generally afforded farmers
no more than two or three days to harvest and transport their bananas to traders. Ship-
ping agents, merchants, and other buyers based in Jamaican ports played a key role in the
early banana trade because they made decisions about fruit quality and pricing. Bananas
judged to be harvested prematurely or damaged were usually discounted or rejected. In
contrast to other kinds of fruit exported in the late nineteenth century, bananas did not
travel in crates during their journey from farm to retail market. In fact, one of the reasons
why shippers preferred Gros Michel over other bananas was on account of its relatively
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where consumers purchased bananas either by weight or by the dozen.
12 The decline in sales during the winter months was due primarily to the limited number of fruit dealers
who had insulated storage facilities in the late nineteenth century.
thick peel and compact bunches that reduced bruising and facilitated tight packing in the
holds of ships.
Gros Michel plants also tended to yield larger bunches than many other varieties, an
important characteristic because shippers set prices based on the number of “hands” of
bananas on a given bunch. In other words, exporters did not pay a price based on weight.
For example, in 1880, John Kerr, hoping to secure a steady supply of fruit in the face of
growing competition from other shippers, offered farmers three-year purchase agree-
ments. He based his purchase price of two shillings on a seven-hand bunch. Kerr agreed
to purchase bunches with fewer hands at significantly reduced prices. The standard
bunch count appears to have steadily increased between 1880 and the 1890s. In 1883,
Kerr renewed his three-year offer, but he agreed to purchase only bunches of seven or
more hands (Hall 1964: 68). One year later, a U.S. consular official reported that an
eight-hand bunch was the “standard size” shipped from Jamaica (Despatches 1884). An
1885 contract between Lorenzo Dow Baker and Boston-based shipper Jesse Freeman
stipulated that “bunches less than eight hands to be invoiced as seconds at half price of
firsts [...] All bunches less than seven hands to be rejected” (Bartlett 1977: 247). As late
as 1887, some shippers accepted seven- and eight-hand bunches when the trade was
“brisk.”10 However, at some point in the 1890s, Baker’s Boston Fruit Company raised
the standard bunch count to nine hands; anything smaller was discounted or rejected.
The “bunch count” would become the standard unit of sale for export bananas through-
out the Caribbean and Latin America.11
Size was not the only thing that mattered in late-nineteenth-century banana markets.
Buying agents for shipping companies frequently rejected fruit brought to the wharves
on account of poor quality. Quality was defined by the “fullness” of the fruit (a charac-
teristic linked to when the fruit was harvested) and the appearance of the fruit peels.
Bruised, sunburned, waterlogged, or chafed bananas developed blemishes as their peels
ripened, a quality generally deemed unacceptable for the export market. In correspon-
dence from 1884, Lorenzo Dow Baker advised his son “[i]n buying bananas this winter
buy only full fruit, no thin fruit at all, not one for they are of no value whatever in a win-
ter market but spring and summer thin fruit will pass very well, and let the fruit be free of
bruises as possible. Nothing like full clean fruit for the winter market” (Bartlett 1977:
61). In stressing the need to purchase only high quality fruit, Baker added, “[n]ever mind
what people say, throw it back on their barrels, let them suffer for it if they will not mind
you” (Bartlett 1977: 61). On another occasion, he told his son to instruct a company pur-
chasing agent that “if they don’t give him clean fruit he must reject the fruit. It is of no
use” (Bartlett 1977: 62). Baker’s blunt instructions reveal how market structures influ-
enced quality standards: the same banana that found a buyer when U.S. consumption
peaked in spring and early summer was likely to be rejected during seasonal lulls.12
The state of transportation infrastructure in Jamaica created challenges for farmers
trying to deliver “clean” fruit. Shipping agents obligated farmers to bring harvested fruit
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Library, Nickerson Room Manuscript Collections.
to designated points, shifting both the costs and risks of ground transportation onto grow-
ers. Cultivators usually wrapped harvested fruit bunches in dry banana leaves before
placing them in carts or drays drawn by mule teams. Perched atop loads ranging from 30
to 40 bunches, drivers traveled from as far as thirty miles to sell their cargo (JAS 1906:
165; and Despatches 1884). Roads were often in poor shape. For example, Thomas Pick-
ersgill, commenting on an 1887 proposal to construct a railroad between Kingston and
Annotta Bay on the north coast, complained that the roads leading from the farm on
which he cultivated bananas were impassable (Minutes 1887: 19). In a letter submitted
before the 1882 Royal Commission, a group of unidentified “laborers” from Portland
wrote “we do think it hard for us to pay taxes and be without good roads to take our pro-
duce to market” (Report 1884: 134).
Tiresome to describe though they may be, the nuances of transactions between farm-
ers and shippers are important for understanding the tensions that gave rise to disputes
over bunch counts, rejections, prices, and point of sale. In addition, the emphasis on
maximizing bunch size and minimizing blemishes on the peel tended to favor growers
who had access to level lands in close proximity to points of sale (often ports) and who
could mobilize labor to weed and prune their bananas. Over time, this led shipping com-
panies to prefer fruit from large estates over bananas from small settler plots (Minutes
1887: 16). Indeed, a desire to control the quality of production convinced Andrew W.
Preston, the U.S.-based director of the Boston Fruit Company and key architect in the
creation of the United Fruit Company, that “the successful company of the future is the
one that controls the growing of its own fruit.”13
From Plots to Plantations
Writing in the New York Times, a North American traveler who visited Port Antonio in
1888 noted the “regular and sometimes extensive banana plantations,” but added, “thou-
sands of bunches of bananas are raised in Jamaica by the colored people a few here and
few there. Nearly every colored man living in the rural parts has his few banana trees scat-
tered here and there about his ‘patch,’ and gathers in a few half dollars annually by carry-
ing his bunches to market. Often he carries a bunch for miles on his head, but oftener yet
he sends his wife with it” (New York Times 02.09.1888: 12). The writer’s assumption that
men were “sending” their banana-bearing “wives” to market reveals his ignorance about
the central role played by women in Jamaican banana production but his description of
plantations mingled with small plots accurately conveyed the transformations taking
place in the organization of production in Jamaica’s primary banana-growing parishes.
In 1879, only one estate near Port Antonio was identified as a “banana plantation.”
By the early 1890s there were more than one hundred banana plantations owned by ship-
pers, merchants, professionals, and some former sugar planters (Hall 1964: 68). Under
the leadership of Lorenzo D. Baker, the Boston Fruit Company became one of the most
important property owners in Jamaica’s banana-growing parishes. By 1887 the company
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had acquired some 13,000 acres (Rodriquez 1955: 26).14 Boston Fruit directly cultivated
a portion of this land in addition to leasing plots to tenant farmers. In fact, in 1888 the
company’s Boundbrook Estate generated considerably more income from rents than
from banana production (Bartlett 1977: 80). John Edward Kerr, one of Boston Fruit’s
principal competitors, also acquired several properties during the 1890s, as did John
Pringle, a retired physician who possessed 2,722 acres in St. Mary in 1897.15 By 1902,
just two entities, the United Fruit Company (formed in 1899 following the merger of the
Boston Fruit Company with twelve other firms) and John Pringle, cultivated nearly 8,000
acres of bananas—more than one fourth of the banana acreage in the four major export-
ing parishes. Smallholders cultivated approximately 3,500 acres. A large and poorly
defined “middle sector” (farms ranging from twenty acres to several hundred acres)
occupied some 16,700 acres.16
The labor force on these newly established banana plantations consisted of inden-
tured South Asians and black Jamaicans. In 1897, John Pringle employed 327 indentured
workers, slightly more than the 297 who labored for the Boston Fruit Company (Minutes
1897: Appendix XVIII). Approximately 2,700 South Asian men and women arrived in
Jamaica between 1899 and 1906 to work on banana farms (Holt 1992: 353). Indentured
laborers formed the core of year-around labor forces on estates. They represented a form
of subsidy to large-scale banana growers because the government provided health care
for the indentured workers, something that reportedly upset Afro-Jamaican day workers
whose tax dollars paid for a benefit that they did not enjoy. The perceived need for
imported workers partly reflected the persistence of small settlers in export banana-
growing parishes throughout the 1890s. For example, in 1897, E. E. C. Hosack, a banana
planter who employed one-hundred indentured laborers, reported “at certain times of the
year they [blacks] cultivate their own banana fields, and especially on Mondays you do
not get any Creole labor to turn out at all, because they go to cut their own fruit” (West
India Royal Commission 1898: 295). 
Nevertheless, between 1897 and 1903, small settler acreage declined in both absolute
terms and as a percentage of total land in banana production.17 The drop was steepest in
St. Mary’s parish where farms smaller than twenty acres fell from 51 percent (4,912 of
9,575 acres) to 12 percent (1,670 of 14,143 acres) of total area in bananas. Significant
declines also took place in Portland and St. Thomas.18 In St. Catherine, banana acreage
more than tripled from 1,703 to 6,048 acres between 1897 and 1903, but smallholders
were almost non-existent, an anomaly that may be attributable to the fact that limited
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14 The Aliens Law Amendment of 1871 permitted foreign entities to purchase land in Jamaica (Satchell
1990: 79, 133).
15 Hall (1964: 68-69); Handbook of Jamaica (1897: 406-09).
16 Prominent island planters held a significant portion of these cultivations, but more research is needed on
the large number of individuals who owned neither plots nor plantations.
17 My analysis of land holdings is derived from a comparison of statistical tables printed in the Handbook
of Jamaica for the years 1897 and 1903. The recorded number of small settlers was probably less than
the actual number because tax evasion was commonplace (Holt 1992: 403-404).
18 In Portland, farms under twenty acres decreased from 39 percent (1,335 of 3,454 acres) to 30 percent
(1,427 of 4758 acres). In St. Thomas the same category fell from 18 percent (533 of 2,897 to less than
14 percent (457 of 3,362 acres).
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rainfall in the parish obligated export banana growers to irrigate, an input that few small
settlers were able to afford.19
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the number of smallholders in important
banana-growing parishes was either stagnating (Portland) or in sharp decline (St. Mary).
The rising prominence of large-scale producers created new problems for small settlers
who faced both falling fruit prices and rising land values. Limited evidence indicates that
the United Fruit Company stymied early attempts to form producer associations (JAS
1902: 156). After a generation in which the number of property holders increased in
Jamaica, the expansion of banana plantations compelled many Afro-Jamaicans to either
lease land or seek out plots in higher elevations that were less than ideal for banana culti-
vation (West India Royal Commission 1897: 314). Government statistics provide indirect
evidence that many small holders in banana-growing parishes switched to other crops
including cacao, coffee and ground provisions.20
Unsurprisingly, this tremendous expansion of banana plantations made it harder for
smallholders to sell their fruit. Upon being questioned by the British Royal Commission
of 1897 if bananas were profitable, Thomas Smickle, a former schoolteacher residing in
St. Thomas parish replied, “they [bananas] are if you can sell them, but I see people with
bananas all around them who cannot get sale for them.” He added that at certain times of
the year, the region’s only buyer, the Boston Fruit Company, rejected all fruit that was
not grown on their farms:
There are times when they reject the small settlers’ fruits because they [Boston Fruit]
have enough of their own. Their policy seems to be to extend their own cultivations as much
as they can. On the whole, the small settlers can get no profit by the cultivation of bananas at
all. Of course they do get sale for them sometimes. But at other times they must get weary of
them [bananas]. I have seen them return from market with these bananas after they have gone
miles with them and have found no one able to buy them, and they have had to return home
with them (West India Royal Commission 1897:325-6).
Eight years later, Reverend E. Arnett cited three reasons for fruit rejections that he
observed in St. Ann parish: immature fruit, damaged fruit and excess supply, the last of
which “would seem to account for the largest number of rejections:” 
I have been informed that at times when the amount required has been secured that whole
cart loads are rejected with the exception of one or two of the best bunches, and unfortunate-
ly this generally happens to those who have come long distances who having had to come so
far, and not being allowed to cut the fruit before Monday morning, cannot get to the wharf
before Monday night. It is especially hard on these persons. Their mules now being tired,
they cannot drag the load 15 or 20 miles back to the mountains, and in so many cases have to
leave the fruit on the beach. It is a very serious loss to the people in terms of time, money and
food (JAS 1905: 248-9).
150 John Soluri
19 In 1902, the four parishes of St. Mary, St. Catherine, St. Thomas, and Portland combined to account for
86 percent (28,311/32,842 acres) of the island’s total banana lands. 
20 In St. Mary, the number of units under twenty acres producing cacao more than doubled from 500 acres
in 1897 to 1,233 acres in 1902 (Handbook of Jamaica 1897: 408; and 1903: 379). In St. Catherine
small-scale coffee acreage increased from 3,974 acres to 6,132 acres (Handbook of Jamaica 1897: 405;
and 1903: 376).
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After receiving multiple complaints about fruit rejections, Arnett decided to observe
the banana purchasing process. Commenting on the plight of one cultivator who had 17
of 20 bunches rejected, he wrote, “This man had gone over twenty miles, and of course it
was impossible for him to cart the fruit home, which meant leaving it on the beach for
practically nothing, a most serious loss to the owner, in food if nothing else—and yet one
cannot expect even a fruit company to buy what they do not need” (JAS 1905: 338). A
number of factors may have contributed to the extremely high rate of rejection described
by Arnett including seasonal dips in U.S. demand and/or premature harvesting on the
part of the grower. What is more significant is that rejections were commonplace in the
early twentieth century when demand in the United States was skyrocketing and produc-
tion in Jamaica and Central America was expanding rapidly. For small settlers hauling
fruit over rough roads to distant points of sale, the late-nineteenth-century banana market
can hardly be described as “open.”
As the century came to a close, friction between shippers and growers increased in
response to an expansion in the number of large-scale farms, many of which were owned
by shipping companies. The backward integration and consolidation orchestrated by
United Fruit’s executives enabled the company to control multiple sources of both sup-
ply and distribution in the largest U.S. markets. In addition, a 1902 deal with Elder
Dempster and Company effectively gave United Fruit control over exports from Jamaica
to Britain (New York Times 03.07.1902: 5). Jamaican smallholders experienced these
changes in the form of stagnant prices and increasing rates of fruit rejections. They also
often found themselves pushed to the geographical peripheries of production areas by
plantations that increasingly occupied prime soils in close proximity to transportation
infrastructure. At times, Jamaican cultivators responded forcefully to their growing mar-
ginalization. In 1899, violent riots broke out in St. Mary parish over the eviction of ten-
ants from a banana plantation (New York Times 15.06.1899: 3). Two years later, banana
growers macheted thousands of harvested bunches rather than sell them to United Fruit
at “reduced prices.” The discord prompted the company to dispatch a representative
from the United States (New York Times 29.08.1901: 2). These last two incidents were
serious enough to be reported in a major U.S. newspaper; I suspect that similar incidents
took place without making headlines.
The colonial government’s responses to the economic transformations of the late
nineteenth century were contradictory: they endorsed “progressive” planters like Loren-
zo Dow Baker at the same time that they rhetorically embraced small proprietorships as
official policy (Holt 1992: 339). Government bureaucrats and agricultural extension
agents simultaneously praised the rapid expansion of the banana industry and raised con-
cerns about environmental degradation in the form of deforestation, soil erosion, and
dessication. Colonial policy makers responded by creating programs that targeted small-
holders whose cultivation practices were generally viewed as inefficient if not ecologi-
cally destructive.
Colonial Discourses on Changing Landscapes 
In 1895, the island government under the leadership of Governor Henry Blake
approved legislation to sell small parcels of Crown lands as part of an effort to promote
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stable small-scale cultivation. That same year, the Jamaica Agricultural Society was
founded to provide technical support to smallholders. The Society’s board of directors
included prominent planters and professionals with scientific training. By the early twen-
tieth century the organization had nearly 3,000 members. In addition to publishing a jour-
nal, the society sponsored traveling instructors who lectured on “scientific agriculture”
and organized regional agricultural fairs. The essays, reports, and correspondence pub-
lished in the journal reveal the deep ambivalence felt by the authors toward small settlers.
They acknowledged that the island’s agricultural production was largely in the hands of
small settlers, yet the journal frequently criticized their farming practices and work ethic.
For example, an essay published in 1905 seemed to lament Jamaica’s post-emancipa-
tion trajectory:
It may be true that ‘la petit culture’ is not the only salvation of a country with a people
like ours who have too little faith in themselves and less in their neighbors, and that numer-
ous large estates, giving labour for all, where the people receiving monthly wages are always
provided for, with few heads taking all the responsibility and care, as in old times, would be
better. But this cannot return even to an appreciable degree, and as the small settler is always
with us, owning his land, but with too often neither money, nor any high degree of percep-
tion, ability, nor industry, we have to make the best of him (JAS 1905: 108-09).
The essay avoids using racial categories to identify the “people” to whom it refers
yet its invocation of large estates bears a strong resemblance to slavery modified by
monthly wages. One suspects that the “few heads” described as “taking all the responsi-
bility and care as in old times” were visualized as white planters, not black small settlers.
But the essay concludes by acknowledging that the small settler—“owning his land”—
was not likely to go away. The implicit goal then of the Jamaica Agricultural Society was
to help with the “uplift” of small settlers by promoting modern agricultural practices.
In a paper read at the West Indian Agricultural Conference in Trinidad, the Inspector
of Schools in Jamaica advocated an institution of “scientific agriculture [...] for the bene-
fit of those who in the future are to be the employers of labor, and the owners or man-
agers of estates. Education does not usually rise up, it filters down, and the most success-
ful means of improving popular agricultural education is undoubtedly the object-lesson
of properly organized and profitable work under efficient management” (JAS 1905: 403).
A 1904 report by the Board of Agriculture and Department of Public Gardens and Plan-
tations echoed the Inspector’s top-down approach: “As the small settlers see the larger
planter improve his field by drainage and deep cultivation, giving plants sufficient space
to get light and air, they will follow.”21 The journal also repeatedly endorsed the prac-
tices of J. E. Kerr and Company and the Boston Fruit Company. As one writer put it,
concluding his essay on the potential for agricultural enterprises in Jamaica, “I cannot
but pay a tribute to that huge concern, the Boston Fruit Company; it has shown what can
be done” (JAS 1900: 20; and 1899: 713-19). Jamaica’s planter elite held Lorenzo Dow
Baker in particularly high esteem.22
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22 Baker was among those invited to speak, along with Governor Henry Blake and other island dignitaries, at
an 1898 meeting convened to discuss the findings of the West Indian Royal Commission (JAS 1898: 20-31). 
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Alongside the articles praising plantation agriculture was a steady stream of essays,
lectures, and reports bemoaning the woeful state of small settler agriculture. The jour-
nal’s criticisms often conflated agricultural practices and moral standing: “In spite of
much advice given as to the necessity of keeping bananas clean and cultivating them
with judgment, so that we may get as good fruit as possible to export, there are to be seen
from the roadsides in the country thousands of stems choked with creepers, while their
owners do not seem to be so very busy doing anything in particular. This sort of gross
carelessness and laziness is a disgrace and the people who own such bananas are ene-
mies to the Island” (JAS 1905: 141). 
In another column, the editors implicitly attributed fruit rejections to small settlers’ infe-
rior cultivation and transportation practices: “The cultivation of bananas is now a science,
and no rule of thumb way of letting the plants grow as they please with many suckers will
bring success. The science consists in getting a maximum of bunches to sell between March
and June when the best prices are offered” (JAS 1905: 58). In other words, the journal’s edi-
tors urged growers to prune their banana plants—which did not require annual replanting—
in such a way as to produce large fruit bunches when U.S. market demand peaked. By prun-
ing all but one sucker, farmers increased the odds that the solitary stem would “shoot” a
nine-handed bunch of bananas. Alternatively, a farmer could leave two suckers with the
hope that they would “shoot a pair of eights,” that is, produce two eight-handed bunches. In
the 1890s, an eight-handed bunch during peak season was worth two-thirds the value of a
nine-handed bunch, meaning that two eights potentially garnered more money for a grower
than a single nine (JAS 1905: 58). However, there was no guarantee the two stalks would
bear eights, and lower bunch counts had little market value. The Jamaica Agricultural Soci-
ety discouraged cultivators from managing for eights, citing the need to preserve the reputa-
tion of “our” fruit: “The stiff competition that we have with Central America and the fine
fruit which is produced there should be constantly kept in mind, and it should be our object
to produce as fine fruit as possible—large bunches and big fingers” (JAS 1905: 58). On
another occasion the journal reminded readers “a good nine-hand bunch in May or June is
better value than three moderate eight-hand bunches in September” (JAS 1905: 141).
In the eyes of the society’s traveling instructors, sound farming practices were predi-
cated on the exigencies of the export market. The language and medium through which
they conveyed their message served to translate a subjective market standard into an
objective, technical practice. There was little that was natural about a nine-handed bunch
of bananas; it represented one of several possible yields, the relative value of which was
determined largely by the shippers who linked sites of production with places of con-
sumption. How growers responded to the Society’s pleas is unclear, but what appeared to
be highly rational to colonial extension agents concerned about “our bananas” may have
been less so to an individual grower trying to balance a finite quantity of labor and capi-
tal with a desire for income. Small settlers often used Gros Michel plants for multiple
purposes including as a shade crop and for self-consumption, uses that likely influenced
their decisions about pruning. Also, heavy pruning tended to make Gros Michel plants
more susceptible to blow downs by removing followers that served to anchor the plants.
Finally, Jamaican men and women frequently migrated to Central America for work,
meaning that there may not have been anyone available to carry out the tasks of pruning
and weeding. By paying close attention to production processes, scholars can better
understand the dynamics of agroexport economies. 
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Small-scale fruit growers were not the only ones targeted for criticism. Assessing the
effects of the 1899 hurricane while presiding over the Agricultural Society’s annual
meeting, acting Governor (and ex-officio chair of the society) Sidney Olivier criticized
small settler provision grounds:
The provision grounds were carried [out] on the hillsides and were in consequence
exposed to the severe weather. If the cultivation had not been in such remote, exposed situa-
tions, the results of the bad weather would not have been so serious. And if the cultivations
had been carried on properly and not on two year shifts they would have been in a much bet-
ter position to withstand such severe blows. It was the object of the society to promote culti-
vation in the true sense, as contrasted with cultivation by catch crops. Cultivation at present
was little better than a process of denudation. No more important work lay before the Society
and its branches than in persuading the people to give up the system of catch crops and to go
in for permanent agriculture (JAS 1900: 526). 
Olivier, who on other occasions praised small settlers for their vital contributions to
the island’s economy, here condemned the shifting agricultural practices of provision
growers and called for the promotion of “permanent” agriculture. Significantly, the
banana sector, which had also been devastated by the hurricane, did not elicit any
remarks from Olivier beyond an acknowledgment that the industry was both “very remu-
nerative” and “precarious.” There is no discussion of the industry’s susceptibility to hur-
ricanes or the hardships faced by plantation workers dismissed in the hurricane’s after-
math (JAS 1899: 701; and The Daily Gleaner 08.12.1899). Olivier also ignored the
tendency of continuously cropped banana plantations to deplete soil nutrients in as few
as five years, compelling many planters to shift their cultivations or invest in fertilizers,
the material and labor costs of which may have been beyond the reach of small settlers
(Minutes 1887: Appendix 31).
Indeed, the banana industry could do little wrong in the eyes of the journal editors
for whom increased fruit production was linked to an abstract idea of progress. Conse-
quently, the same journal that published Olivier’s condemnation of smallholders’ use of
hillsides for provision crops assigned entirely different values to similar land transforma-
tions wrought by banana cultivation: “bananas [...] have been brought from the remotest
parts of the island [...] until now, there is hardly a corner from the hilltops and mountain
valleys in the heart of the country but where bananas are profitably being marketed and
increased quantities hopefully being planted. It is wonderful!” (JAS 1900: 402-03). For
at least some of the journal’s contributors, the road to the island’s prosperity was literally
lined with bananas.
The extent to which the island government’s thinking was constrained by its export-
oriented development model is revealed in the following exchange published in the Soci-
ety’s journal in 1902. In a lengthy letter, one of the Society’s traveling instructors
expressed concern that the government’s tax collecting activities were causing small set-
tlers to abandon their homesteads and migrate to Crown lands in order “to be left in
undisturbed possession for a term of years” and to avoid tax collectors (JAS 1902: 279-
80). The letter drew responses both from the journal’s editors and the Colonial Secretary.
The editors argued that many people preferred to rent lands on an annual basis in order to
ensure suitable soils for the crops they wished to grow and to avoid taxes. They emphat-
ically denied the existence of a land shortage: “We say deliberately that all the cry of no
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lands to be had has no foundation at all [...] Good land may always be bought by settlers
and cheaply too; but of course they may not get it in St. Mary or St. Andrew. That is why
people in congested countries emigrate to the backwoods of Canada or Queensland, to
get land of their own cheaply” (JAS 1902: 280). Acknowledging that crown lands in St.
Mary might be unavailable due to “congestion,” the editors’ analogy seemed to encour-
age small settlers to venture into the “backwoods” of the island in order to obtain inex-
pensive lands—concerns over resource conservation momentarily forgotten. Thus, while
condemning the transitory habits of the small settlers as wasteful of natural resources,
the colonial government’s own ideas about development provided few alternatives to the
expansion of small settler agriculture on sloping lands in the island’s interior.
To judge by this review in the Journal of the Jamaica Agricultural Society, govern-
ment officials and bureaucrats in Jamaica viewed the late nineteenth-century transforma-
tion of the landscape with a peculiar mixture of alarm and satisfaction. They hoped that
export banana production would be the salvation of the island’s plantation economy and
promoted it with vigor. The Agricultural Society’s traveling instructors monitored and
criticized small settlers who grew provision crops or bananas using techniques judged to
be inefficient and wasteful of natural resources. But colonial officials’ discussions of
land use seldom considered how the political ecology of Jamaica’s export-banana zones
severely limited the set of options available to small settlers for whom fertile, level lands
were seldom available and who were compelled by the market standards for bananas to
adopt practices such as “clean weeding” and monocultures that hastened erosion rates
and soil nutrient depletion. In short, by failing to consider the constraints imposed on
small settlers by state policies and commodity market structures, colonial officials mis-
read both the causes and meanings of economic and environmental transformations in
Jamaica.
Colonial officials’ faith in the progressive character of the export banana industry
would not be shaken until the 1920s when concerns over both United Fruit’s monopoly
power and the spread of Panama disease prompted the government of Jamaica to subsi-
dize the creation of a small-scale growers’ cooperative, and to establish banana research
stations in Jamaica and Trinidad. In 1932, the British government placed a tariff on
banana imports from non-empire sources. These initiatives met with partial success;
Jamaica’s banana exports captured a large portion of the British market before World
War II abruptly interrupted trade. At the same time, the spread of Panama disease accel-
erated, and a second plant disease epidemic, Sigatoka, struck Gros Michel farms
throughout the Caribbean and Central America. Following the end of the war, the British
Ministry of Food became the exclusive importer of bananas. The government subse-
quently approved the importation of a Panama disease-resistant banana variety (Lacatan)
thereby creating new opportunities for smallholders in both Jamaica and the Windward
Islands (Grossman 1998: 34-43). 
Conclusions: Bananas Before the Split
I began this article by suggesting that the historical connections between the
Caribbean and Central American export banana trades have been unintentionally
obscured by an outpouring of scholarship focused on the twentieth century. I will con-
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clude by calling attention to some compelling similarities between Jamaica, a colony of
the British Empire, and Honduras, a Central American republic often depicted as the
quintessential “banana republic.” Export banana production in Honduras started at virtu-
ally the same time as it did in Jamaica. In fact, Anglophone blacks on the Bay Islands (a
British possession until 1861) dominated production during the 1870s and 1880s. The
center of production started to shift to the Honduran mainland in the 1880s, a move facil-
itated in part by government policies that subsidized steam traffic to mainland ports. As
was the case in Jamaica, smallholders, or poquiteros, constituted the vast majority of
mainland growers: in 1899 seventy percent of the producers farmed fewer than fifteen
acres. Nevertheless, a significant degree of stratification among growers already existed;
less than three percent of the farms accounted for twenty-eight percent of the land in
bananas (Soluri 2005: 22-24). Evidence of conflicts in Honduras between growers and
shippers over prices, fruit rejections, and shipping schedules can be found from the early
1880s—long before shipping companies began to integrate vertically. As was the case in
Jamaica, a relatively competitive market enabled, but did not guarantee, prosperity for
late-nineteenth-century producers in Honduras.
The Honduran state simultaneously supported small- and large-scale agriculture,
generating contradictions not unlike those described for Jamaica. For example, in Hon-
duras both municipal and national government policies promoted smallholder agricul-
ture via grants of usufruct rights and zoning regulations that favored farmers over ranch-
ers. At the same time, the national government granted North American investors a series
of broad-based concessions that laid the legal foundation for shipping companies, includ-
ing both Standard Fruit and United Fruit, to establish plantations in Honduras and begin
to undermine the market position of non-company growers.23 In sum, both government
land policies and expanding commodity markets helped to create livelihoods for small-
holders in Jamaica and Honduras, but state and market institutions simultaneously func-
tioned to control small-scale cultivators in the name of agricultural efficiency and market
standards. 
The vertical integration that took place in early twentieth-century Honduras did not
bring about an elimination of smallholders—who often established themselves near rail-
road lines built and operated by shipping companies—but it did drastically reduce their
share of total banana exports from Honduras (Soluri 2005: 41-127). The economic posi-
tion of non-company growers worsened in the late 1930s due to a combination of falling
prices for bananas and plant disease epidemics. During World War II some observers
described non-company growers in Honduras as doing little more than collecting rent on
their farms at rates set by United Fruit (Soluri 2005: 111). By the mid-twentieth century
then, smallholders in Honduras and Jamaica occupied similarly marginal positions in the
banana trade. 
The similar historical trajectories of Jamaican small settlers and Honduran
poquiteros between 1870 and 1950 suggest that scholarship on the export banana trade
would benefit from analytical concepts and explanatory frameworks that are not bound-
ed by geopolitical borders. This is hardly a radical suggestion given that shipping com-
panies in general and the United Fruit Company in particular operated on transnational
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scales. The ability of a handful of companies to integrate vertically was crucial, less so
because the companies’ expansive land acquisitions turned smallholders into wage labor-
ers than because it enabled shippers to gain considerable control over the quantity and
quality of a highly perishable agricultural commodity. United Fruit’s domination of the
U.S. market—far larger than any single European market during the first half of the
twentieth century—meant that grower cooperatives faced enormous obstacles finding
viable market outlets. 
Historians also need to probe the archives for further insights into the export banana
trade’s nineteenth century beginnings, an era when many key elements, including the
banana variety, shipping techniques, and quality standards, were established. In both
Honduras and Jamaica, tensions between shippers and growers over prices, fruit grading,
and transportation monopolies pre-dated vertical integration. In fact, there can be little
doubt that sorting out the “chaos” of late nineteenth century banana trades will help to
explain how and why integration and consolidation took place. Consequently, in order
both to explain the power of United Fruit in a wide range of political contexts, and to
imagine alternatives to contemporary banana commodity systems, researchers should
focus more attention on the brief yet dynamic period of bananas before plantations.
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